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18 February 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Cyprus



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DAILY BRIEF

*Cyprus: UN Secretary General U Thant's proposals for easing the Cypriot crisis appear acceptable to Greece and Britain but may be strongly opposed by Turkey.

A UN official yesterday stated that the Secretary General's plan calls for an international peace-keeping force, under his control, to be sent to Cyprus. The Secretary General would be assisted by an advisory committee of Brazil, Norway, and Morocco.

The troop contingents would be agreed upon in advance by those directly concerned--Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey--but would include British troops and would be under a British commander. Other reports have indicated that financing the operation would be the responsibility of the participating nations, rather than of the UN.

Thant has previously discussed his proposals with both the Greek representative at the UN and British Foreign Minister Butler. Both apparently were receptive. Ankara's reaction may be negative unless Thant can convince the Turks that his plan will be as effective as they believe the US-UK plan would have been in protecting the lives of the Turkish Cypriot community.

There is also no assurance that the Greek Cypriots would accept the Secretary General's proposals. President Makarios repeatedly has insisted that the Security Council must pass a resolution condemning

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aggression against his country and reaffirming Cyprus' territorial integrity before he will discuss the question of an international peace-keeping force.

The newest trouble spot on the island is the town of Polis in the extreme west. British troops withdrew from Polis to Limassol during the height of fighting in the latter city last week.

British forces are insufficient to police the entire island, although another 300 troops are being sent from Britain to augment the present 5,000-man force.

Nicosia is quiet but tense. The commander of the Turkish Army contingent on Cyprus recently handed the British truce force commander a letter stating that the Turkish contingent would be forced to intervene if fighting again broke out in the capital.

Turkish correspondents in Cyprus continue to send home inflammatory reports. A 17 February report to the newspaper Hurriyet in Istanbul stated that a Greek militia force of 700 men had disembarked at Limassol, even though the British truce force commander had already denied this story. The press report also warned of an "imminent mass offensive" by the Greek Cypriot irregulars against Turks on the island.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Greece: The decisive victory of George Papandreou's moderate, pro-Western Center Union (EK) in the 16 February elections should give Greece a stable government to deal with the Cyprus crisis.

In contrast to its slim plurality in last November's election, the EK won at least 170 out of 300 seats in parliament.

According to near-final unofficial returns, the moderately conservative National Radical Union of former Premier Karamanlis, running in alliance with the small conservative Progressive Party, retained less than 110 seats. The Communist-dominated United Democratic Left won about 20 seats.

The desire of many Greeks for a stable government to deal with the Cyprus issue was probably the most important factor in the EK victory. The EK's progressive domestic proposals and the "time for a change" psychology also contributed to the result.

Papandreu's new government may ally itself more closely with Cypriot President Makarios than did the caretaker regime. Late in the campaign the EK came out strongly in opposition to the Anglo-American plan for an international police force drawn from NATO countries.

EK spokesmen also condemned the old Karamanlis government for having signed the 1959 London-Zurich agreements which set the framework of the present Cyprus Republic.

Although Papandreu has called for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem, the highly emotional

atmosphere in Greece would force his government to react decisively to unilateral Turkish intervention on the island.

The US Embassy in Athens believes the EK will continue the policy of close collaboration with Washington, but will move more energetically than did Karamanlis toward improving relations with the Soviet bloc.

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North Vietnam - USSR: Hanoi apparently remains dissatisfied with Moscow's support for the war in South Vietnam.

The communique issued following the visit of a high-level North Vietnamese party delegation to Moscow from 31 January to 10 February suggests that one objective of the delegates was to get a step-up in Soviet political and diplomatic pressure against US policy in South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese apparently are skeptical, however, that more effective Soviet backing will materialize.

In a 15 February editorial on the visit, Hanoi welcomed the renewed pledge of Soviet support contained in the communique, but declared that the pledge must be translated into "practical deeds" to form a "valuable contribution" to the war.

The outcome of the mission will probably strengthen the hand of the militant pro-Chinese faction of the North Vietnamese party, which has long urged more vigorous measures to bolster the Communist position in South Vietnam. The delegation was led by party first secretary Le Duan, considered a leading spokesman for the militants.

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East Germany - Soviet Bloc: East Germany has openly criticized several East European countries whose policies have adversely affected the stability of the Ulbricht regime.

A politburo report of the just-concluded East German party plenum publicly reveals for the first time the existence of a deep rift between East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The report emphasized the problems caused in East Germany by the influence of views which "reach us from Prague"--an obvious reference to Czechoslovakia's de-Stalinization measures. [Relations between the two countries have been deteriorating at least since last June.]

The report also castigated other Eastern European countries for having signed trade agreements with Bonn which, in effect, accept West Berlin's inclusion in West Germany for trade purposes. Although the report did not specify the countries by name, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania signed such agreements last year. Sofia and Prague are considering signing similar agreements with Bonn.

The report hints at the East German party's dissatisfaction with the USSR for underrating the regime's difficulties in ideological matters and for failing to ensure that the Eastern European countries take proper account of its difficulties.

This East German attitude could have even more serious consequences for Soviet bloc unity in the long run than Rumania's opposition to certain bloc economic policies.

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